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To Peat Mine or Not to Peat Mine: The Supreme Court’s Opportunity 
to Determine if a “Clean Water Act” Approved Jurisdictional 
Determination Affects a Landowner’s Legal Rights 
Hawkes Co., Inc., et al v. United States Army of Engineers1 
Garrett Pratt 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Clean Water Act (“CWA”) requires a landowner to receive a 
permit from the United States Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) before he 
or she comducts any activity on his or her land if that activity may affect 
“waters of the United States.”2 Why, then, would a Corps officer determine 
that a parcel of land – located over 100 miles away from qualifying 
jurisdictional waters – is subject to CWA permitting? Moreover, when a 
landowner appeals such a determination and a reviewing Corps officer 
decides that the Corps’ local office was incorrect, why is it acceptable for the 
Corps to do no additional investigation and hold that its “Approved 
Jurisdictional Determination” (“AJD”) is accurate and final?  
This is the current situation of Hawkes Company, Inc. (“Hawkes”). 
Hawkes filed a lawsuit against the Corps and the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) seeking judicial review of the Corps’ AJD as a “final 
agency action” under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). The Corps 
maintains that an AJD is not a “final agency action” under the APA because 
an AJD does not affect a landowner’s “legal rights or obligations, [n]or is a 
decision from which legal consequences flow.”3 Hawkes contends that its 
legal rights and obligations are substantially affected by its AJD.4 
                                                
1 782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015).  
2 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (2012); 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012).  
3 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997). 
4 Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 996. 
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In 2015, there were two cases on writ of certiorari before the United 
States Supreme Court, each reaching a different conclusion concerning 
whether a landowner may receive judicial review of a Corps’ AJD.5 The 
Court should resolve this split by affirming the Eighth Circuit’s decision in 
Hawkes Co., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, which correctly 
determined that an AJD affects a landowner’s legal rights.  
This note will outline the facts in Hawkes, the relevant legal history 
on the intersection of the CWA and the APA, and the Eighth Circuit’s legal 
analysis in Hawkes. This note’s discussion of Hawkes supports the 
conclusions that: (1) an AJD affects a landowner’s legal rights; (2) judicial 
review is an effective incentive for the Corps to ensure the accuracy of AJD; 
(3) judicial review ensures the accuracy of AJD; (4) and alternatively,  to 
avoid judicial review, the EPA could create a second AJD administrative 
appeal before a landowner brings a lawsuit against the agencies.     
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
Appellant, Hawkes Co., Inc. (“Hawkes”), is a peat-mining company 
located in northwestern Minnesota.6 Hawkes desired to expand its peat-
mining activities to a nearby 530-acre parcel of wetland (“the parcel”) owned 
by two of Hawkes’ affiliated companies.7 Under Minnesota law, peat mining 
is a “wetland dependent” activity regulated by permits granted by the local 
Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) and other state and federal regulatory 
agencies.8 The Clean Water Act (“CWA”) defines a “jurisdictional wetland” 
as a parcel of land subject to permitting regulations “as waters of the United 
States.”9  
 
                                                
5  Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 994 cert. granted, 136 S.Ct. 615 (2015); Kent Recycling Services v. 
United States Army Corps of Engineers petition for cert. filed 2014 WL 5475208 (U.S.); 
cert. refiled sub nom Kent Recycling Services v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 
761 F.3d 383 (2015); cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 1548 (2015).  
6 Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 996. 
7 Id. at 998. Pierce Investment Co. (“Pierce”) and LPF Properties, LLC (“LPF”) are closely-
held corporations owned by members of the Pierce family. Id. 
8 Id. at 997. The development of wetlands in Minnesota is also subject to regulations and 
permits required by Environmental Protection Agency and the Minnesota Department of 
Natural Resources (“MDNR”). Id.   
9 Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(a), 1362(7) (2014)). 
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In December 2010, Hawkes began the CWA permit application 
process with the Corps’ local office.10 After Hawkes filed its permit 
application, Corps officials repeatedly indicated to Hawkes, from January to 
August 2011, that it should abandon its expansion plans because the 
permitting process would be expensive, lengthy, and it was uncertain whether 
Hawkes would receive a permit.11 In a draft Jurisdictional Determination, the 
Corps concluded that the parcel was connected to a “relatively permanent 
water source” via a series of culverts and unnamed streams that flowed into 
the Middle River, which flowed into the Red River — a river located 120 
miles away from the parcel.12 Hawkes found this determination extreme and 
questioned its accuracy.13 Hawkes’ environmental consultant cited several 
errors in the Corps’ analysis.14 Nevertheless, the Corps released its Approved 
Jurisdictional Determination (“AJD”) in February 2012, affirming that the 
parcel was a jurisdictional wetland because a “significant nexus” existed 
between the parcel and the Red River.15  
 
Hawkes filed a timely administrative appeal of the AJD, and in 
October 2012, the Corps’ Deputy Commanding General for Civil and 
Emergency Operations sustained Hawkes’ appeal.16 The Corps’ reviewing 
officer remanded the matter for reconsideration because the Corps had not 
amassed sufficient “[factual] support … to determine that the [parcel] 
contained jurisdictional wetlands and waters.”17 However, the Corps, in 
December 2012, issued an amended AJD reaffirming its position that the 
parcel contained jurisdictional wetlands without providing additional 
information.18 The AJD also stated that Hawkes had exhausted its 
                                                
10 Id. at 998.  
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id.  
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
TO PEAT MINE OR NOT TO PEAT MINE 
272 
 
administrative remedies, and that the present determination was the Corps’ 
final jurisdictional decision concerning the parcel.19 
Hawkes subsequently filed a lawsuit against the Corps seeking 
judicial review of the AJD in the United States District Court of Minnesota.20 
The Corps moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Hawkes had not 
exhausted its administrative remedies because the AJD was not a “final 
agency action.”21 The district court applied the two-prong test in Bennett v. 
Spear22 to determine if the Corps’ AJD was a “final agency action” under the 
APA. The court found that the Corps’ AJD met the first prong of the Bennett 
test because the AJD reflected the “consummation of the Corps’ decision-
making process.”23 However, the second prong of the Bennett test, that the 
agency’s decision affected the legal rights of the aggrieved party, was not 
met because the Corps’ decision did not require Hawkes to take any sort of 
action.24 Additionally, the court stated that Hawkes could continue in the 
CWA permit process or pursue its mining operations on the parcel without a 
CWA permit, but it would assume the potential risk of incurring CWA 
penalties.25 Because the Bennett test was not met, the AJD was not subject to 
judicial review. The AJD was not a final agency action, and the district court 
dismissed Hawkes’ action, which Hawkes timely appealed to the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.26 
The Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s motion to dismiss and 
reversed the decision.27 As such, precedent was established that a Corps’ 
                                                
19 Id.  
20 Id. at 994.  
21 Id. (citing Hawkes Co., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 963 F.Supp.2d 868, 871, 
878 (D. Minn. 2013)). 
22 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997). First, the action must mark the 
consummation of the agency's decision-making process — it must not be of a merely 
tentative or interlocutory nature. Id. Second, the action must be one by which rights or 
obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow. Id. 
23 Hawkes, 963 F.Supp.2d at 871. 
24 Id. at 873-74 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997)).  
25 Id. at 875. 
26 Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 999. 
27 Id. 
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AJD is a final agency action that qualifies for immediate judicial review 
because it affects a landowner’s legal rights and obligations.28  
 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This section outlines the legislative history and the relevant statutory 
and regulatory components of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and the 
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). The section concludes with a 
discussion of the only cases that have assessed whether a CWA Approved 
Jurisdictional Determination (“AJD”) is a “final agency action.”29 
A. Competing Definitions of “Jurisdictional Waters” Under the 
 “Clean Water Act” 
Congress enacted the CWA in 1972 to restore and maintain the 
“chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters” and to 
acknowledge and ensure “the primary responsibilities and rights of the States 
. . . to plan the development and use . . . of land and water resources.”30 The 
CWA prohibits the discharge of pollution into “the navigable waters of the 
United States” without a permit.31 A landowner who makes an unpermitted 
discharge is subject to an Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
compliance order, and can be fined up to $75,000 for each day he or she is in 
violation of the CWA.32   
                                                
28 Id.  
29 Two cases were before the Supreme Court in its 2016 session: (1) Hawkes Co., Inc., et al 
v. United States Army of Engineers, 782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015);  and (2) Belle Co., LLC v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers petition for cert. filed 2014 WL 5475208 (U.S.); cert. refiled 
sub nom Kent Recycling Services v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 761 F.3d 383 
(2015) cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 1548 (2015). However, the Supreme Court denied Certioari in 
Kent Recycling. Id.  
30 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)-(b) (2012).  
31 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1344 (2012).   
32 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(a)(3), (d) (2012). 
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The CWA’s jurisdiction only extends to “navigable waters of the 
United States.”33 This phrase was not defined within the CWA and has been 
subject to two interpretations over its 40-year history: (1) the traditional 
definition and (2) the Corps/EPA modern definition.34 Prior to the CWA, 
“navigable waters of the United States” meant “interstate waters that are 
‘navigable in fact’ or readily susceptible of being rendered so.”35 The 
traditional definition construed water narrowly to only include “relatively 
permanent bodies of water, as opposed to ordinarily dry channels through 
which water occasionally . . . flows.”36 The United States Supreme Court 
expanded the traditional definition of “navigable waters” to include wetlands 
that are physically adjacent to traditional navigable waters.37 Specifically, the 
Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Rapanos v. United States held that the 
traditional definition, with the physically adjacent wetlands expansion, is the 
only definition consistent with the CWA’s stated policy goals.38  
On the other hand, the modern Corps/EPA definition is far more 
expansive than the traditional definition. While the Corps and the EPA 
initially adopted the traditional definition, the agencies have significantly 
expanded the statute’s meaning to include “virtually any land feature over 
which rainwater or drainage passes and leaves a visible mark.”39 Presently, 
the Corps and the EPA intentionally allow local Corps offices to have their 
own interpretations.40 As a result, there is great variation in definitions across 
local Corps offices.41  
B. The Two-Prong Bennett v. Spear Test 
The Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) was adopted in 1946, 
and it ensures protection of the constitutional rights of those who are subject 
to an administrative agency’s regulation.42 The APA permits judicial review 
                                                
33 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012). 
34 See generally Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).  
35 Id. at 723 (citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870)). 
36 Id. at 716. 
37 Id. at 734-35 (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 
(1985)).   
38 Id. at 731-32. 
39 Id. at 725 (citing 33 CFR §328.3(e) (2014)).  
40 Id. at 727.   
41 Id. 
42 Pat McCarran, Congressional Record Citation, March 12, 1946. “[T]he purpose of which 
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of a “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a 
court.”43 Through this legislation, Congress intended that judicial review be 
widely available to challenge federal agency actions.44 The Supreme Court in 
Bennett v. Spear created a two-prong test to determine if an agency action 
was final. First, the action must mark the consummation of the agency's 
decision-making process — it must not be of a merely tentative or 
interlocutory nature.45 Second, the action must be one by which rights or 
obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will 
flow.46  
C. Case Law is Split on Whether an AJD is a “Final Agency Action” 
Only two cases have addressed whether an AJD is a final agency 
action under the two-prong Bennett test. The Supreme Court determined that 
an AJD is a final agency action in Sackett v. EPA and held that it is not in 
Belle Co., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.47  First, in Sackett v. EPA, 
the EPA issued a compliance order to a landowner who filled one half-acre of 
her land with dirt and rock while building a house.48 The EPA claimed that 
the landowner polluted waters subject to EPA permitting requirements.49 If 
the landowner did not comply, she would have been subject to fines of up to 
$75,000 per day she was in violation.50 The landowner sought judicial review 
of the compliance order and its underlying AJD.51  
                                                                                                                     
is to improve the administration of justice by prescribing fair administrative procedure, is a 
bill of rights for the hundreds of thousands of Americans whose affairs are controlled or 
regulated in one way or another by agencies of the Federal government. It is designed to 
provide guarantees of due process in administrative procedure.” Id.  
43 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).   
44 See generally Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); see also Block v. Community 
Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984) (affirming that the APA creates a “presumption 
favoring judicial review of administrative action”).  
45 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997).  
46 Id. 
47 Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374 (2012); Belle Co., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 2014). 
48 Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1370 (2012).  
49 Id. at 1371. 
50 Id. at 1372. 
51 Id. at 1374. 
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The Supreme Court held that the compliance order was a final agency 
action that satisfied the two-prong Bennett test.52 First, the EPA’s issuance of 
the compliance order represented the consummation of its decision-making 
process because the pronouncement that the landowner’s property was 
subject to CWA permitting was not subject to any further agency review.53 
The Court determined the agency’s decision-making was final even though 
the EPA had not filed a civil enforcement action against the landowner.54 
Second, the Court said that the landowner’s legal rights and obligations were 
affected by the EPA’s compliance order because the landowner had to restore 
her property according to the agency’s requirements, permit the EPA access 
to her property, and potentially pay “double penalties in future enforcement 
proceedings.”55 The Court stated that the APA’s presumption of judicial 
review was not preempted by any CWA provision that would result in 
“strong-arming  . . . regulated parties into ‘voluntary compliance’ without the 
opportunity for judicial review — even judicial review of the question 
whether the regulated party is within the EPA’s jurisdiction.”56 
The second case which has addressed whether an AJD is a final 
agency action is Belle Co., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.57 In Belle, 
a landowner sought judicial review of a Corps AJD that would force the 
landowner to receive a CWA permit before it could use a portion of the 
property as a landfill.58 The Fifth Circuit determined that the AJD represented 
the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process for the same 
reasons the Supreme Court outlined in Sackett.59 However, the Fifth Circuit 
determined that the second prong of the Bennett test was not satisfied because 
the AJD did not affect the landowner’s legal rights or obligations in the same 
manner as the EPA compliance order in Sackett.60 The Fifth Circuit gave four 
reasons why the two cases were distinguishable.  
                                                
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 1372. 
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 1371-72. 
56 Id. at 1374. 
57 Belle Co., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2014). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 389. 
60 Id. at 391. 
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First, an AJD alone does not obligate the landowner to take or abstain 
from taking any action on his or her property.61 The court reinforced its 
analysis by claiming that prior to Sackett, all courts addressing the issue 
determined that an AJD did not sufficiently affect the legal rights or 
obligations of a party.62 Second, an AJD does not generate “a penalty 
scheme” or compel the landowner’s compliance with the determination.63 
Third, an AJD does not independently preclude the landowner from obtaining 
necessary permits.64 Fourth, the landowner in Sackett had dumped material 
into wetlands in violation of the CWA and was consequently liable for 
incurring penalties.65 The court stated that Belle seeking judicial review of 
the AJD was inconsistent with the established regulatory review procedure.66 
The court also noted the court would discourage the Corps from providing an 
AJD before a landowner became subject to a compliance order or an 
enforcement action for a CWA violation.67 As a result, the landowner could 
not receive judicial review of the AJD.68  
Hawkes is factually similar to Belle because both cases touch upon 
whether a landowner may receive judicial review of a Corps’ AJD. Both 
appellate court opinions also agreed that the determinations represented the 
consummation of the Corps’ decision-making process. However, the Fifth 
Circuit in Belle held that an AJD does not affect a landowner’s legal rights 
and obligations, whereas the Eighth Circuit in Hawkes determined that it 
does.69 Both cases characterize the policy objectives of the APA and the 
CWA differently, and both claim its interpretation of Sackett is superior.70  
                                                
61 Id. at 390. 
62 Id. at 391. 
63 Id. at 392.  
64 Id. at 393. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 394. 
67 Id. 
68 Id.  
69 Hawkes Co., Inc., et al v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994, 999 (8th Cir. 2015); 
Belle Co., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 2014). 
70 Compare Hawkes Co., Inc., et al v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994, 996-97, 
1000 (8th Cir. 2015) with Belle Co., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 390, 
392 (5th Cir. 2014). 
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IV. INSTANT DECISION 
The Eighth Circuit determined that Hawkes’ Clean Water Act 
(“CWA”) Approved Jurisdictional Determination (“AJD”) was a final agency 
action subject to judicial review.71 The court applied the two-prong Bennett 
test72 to determine if the AJD was a final agency action: “[T]he action must 
mark the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process . . . [and] 
the action must be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, 
or from which legal consequences flow.”73  
First, the Eighth Circuit determined the first prong of the Bennett test 
was met because CWA regulations state that an AJD constitutes a Corps’ 
final agency action.74  The court also cited a Corps Regulatory Guidance 
Letter that stated an AJD may be “relied on by a landowner, permit applicant, 
or other affected party.”75 Second, the Eighth Circuit determined that Hawkes 
satisfied the second prong of the Bennett test because Hawkes’ legal rights 
and obligations were determined by the Corps’ AJD.76 The Eighth Circuit 
gave four reasons why the AJD affected Hawkes’ legal rights and 
obligations.   
The court first cited the significant cost, time delay, and unlikely 
positive outcome to Hawkes if it were to pursue completing the permit 
process.77 The Eighth Circuit relied on Rapanos v. United States, in which 
the Supreme Court found that the Corps permit applicants generally spend 
more than three-quarters of a million dollars and two years to complete the 
permitting process.78 The court was also unwilling to deny Hawkes judicial 
review when the record indicated that multiple Corps officials told Hawkes 
that it inevitably would be denied a permit.79 This alone satisfied the second 
prong of the Bennett test, because Hawkes would never be able to recover 
                                                
71 Hawkes Co., Inc., et al v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994, 999 (8th Cir. 2015). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997)). 
74 Id. (citing 33 CFR § 320.1(a)(6) (2012)).  
75 Id. (quoting Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 08–02, at 2, 5). 
76 Id. at 1000-01 
77 Id. at 1001. 
78 Id. (citing Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006)). 
79 Id. 
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lost time or money in seeking a permit it was not legally obligated to 
obtain.80  
The second reason the Eighth Circuit determined that the AJD 
affected Hawkes’ legal rights was that the AJD increased the penalties 
Hawkes would incur if it mined without a permit.81  The court rejected the 
Corps’ argument that Hawkes had an adequate remedy in choosing to 
commence peat-mining without a permit because doing so would force it to 
await agency enforcement and cause Hawkes to incur significant criminal 
penalties, including imprisonment, for knowingly violating the CWA.82 
When the district court agreed with this argument, it grossly mischaracterized 
the regulatory action’s force and conflated the difference between an agency 
action that “compels affirmative action and an order that prohibits a party 
from taking otherwise lawful action.”83 The Eighth Circuit also stated that the 
district court’s determination was inconsistent with relevant Supreme Court 
precedent.84  Ultimately, because of “the [CWA’s] draconian penalties 
                                                
80 Id. 
81 Id.  
82 Id.  
83 Id. at 1000.  
84  Id. at 1000-01. First, the court cited that in Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 158 (1997), a 
Fish and Wildlife Service biological opinion that made compliance with its orders mandatory 
on the Bureau of Reclamation met the second part of the Bennett test because the agency 
opinion had “direct and appreciable legal consequences.” Id. at 1000 (quoting Bennett, 520 
US at 158). In the instant case, the AJD required Hawkes to either pay the significant fees 
associated with the permitting process, give up its pursuit of using its land for peat-mining, 
or proceed to mine but incur substantial enforcement penalties. Id. 
 Second, prescription drug labeling regulations constituted a judicially reviewable 
final agency action because they “purport to give an authoritative interpretation of a statutory 
provision” that places drug companies in a catch-22 of either incurring massive compliance 
costs or risking criminal and civil penalties for violating the regulation. Id. (quoting Abbott 
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152-53 (1967)).  
Third, the Supreme Court held in Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 
40, 76 (1956), that an Interstate Communications Commission order claiming that certain 
types of agricultural commodities were subject to regulations requiring carriers to obtain a 
permit to transport such materials was a reviewable final agency action. Id. at 1000. The 
court held this even though the order was issued generally to all interstate transporters of 
agricultural commodities and enforcement would only occur when the Commission would 
identify a non-complying entity and later bring an enforcement action against the carrier 
because the order had an immediate and practical impact because of the risk of penalties. Id.  
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imposed for the sort of violations alleged in this case . . . [the CWA] leaves 
most property owners with little practical alternative but to dance to the EPA 
[or the Corps’] tune.”85 
Further, the Eighth Circuit’s third reason that the AJD affected 
Hawkes’ legal rights was that the record strongly indicated that the Corps 
intended to prevent Hawkes’ peat-mining operation from commencing and 
avoid judicial scrutiny of the accuracy of its AJD.86 The court acknowledged 
that the Corps’ own officers, on appeal, determined the AJD was 
insufficient.87 The Corps has granted broad authority to local Corps 
representatives in determining the agency’s jurisdiction.88 Therefore, by 
allowing such unchecked authority, it would make it nearly impossible for 
parties potentially subject to regulation to challenge these administrative 
decisions by judicial review.89 The Eighth Circuit explained that the Corps 
has intentionally given local Corps offices broad discretion to claim 
permitting restrictions, which has led to claims of jurisdiction on “adjacent 
wetlands . . . connected to navigable water by flooding . . . [occurring once 
every century].”90 Allowing such unfettered agency authority to remain 
judicially unchecked is inapposite to the APA’s presumption of immediate 
                                                                                                                     
In the present case, the court noted that the Corps’ AJD is more likely to affect the 
substantial rights of Hawkes than the order in Frozen Food Express because the 
jurisdictional determination pertained to Hawkes specifically and its property and violation 
of the action would guarantee Hawkes’ civil and criminal liability, whereas the order in 
Frozen Food Express was only a general order to all carriers. Id.  
 Fourth, Columbia Broadcasting v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942), held that a 
Federal Communications Commission regulation that barred the licensing of stations that 
entered into network contracts, though not self-executing, was subject to immediate judicial 
review because the regulation would effectively change and adversely impact the appellant’s 
contractual rights and business relationships. Id. at 1000-01 (citing Columbia Broadcasting, 
316 U.S. at 422). The court in the instant case drew strong parallels between these two cases 
because the jurisdictional determination has impacted Hawkes’ lawful use of its property to 
conduct a lawful business. Id. at 1000-01. The court again cited Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 
1367, 1372 (2012), to underscore that final agency actions are not only reviewable when they 
are self-executing. Id. at 1001.    
85 Id. at 1002 (quoting Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1375 (2012) (Alito, J. concurring)).  
86 Id. at 998.  
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 1001-02.  
89 Id.  
90 Id. (citing Rapanos v. United States 547 U.S. 715, 727-28 (2006)). 
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judicial review of final agency actions91 and inconsistent with the APA’s 
legislative intent.92  
Finally, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that continuance of such an 
unfettered agency power exerted over private land owners was difficult to 
reconcile in a nation that values due process and private property.93  
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded 
the case for further proceedings.94 Circuit Judge Jane Kelly filed a concurring 
opinion in which she distinguished the factual circumstances of the present 
case from Sackett.95 Judge Kelly nevertheless concluded that immediate 
judicial review of the Corps determination was warranted because review of 
whether a piece of land is under the jurisdiction of the CWA is the very 
reason the Supreme Court in Sackett deemed jurisdictional determinations as 
judicially reviewable.96  
V. COMMENT 
 The Supreme Court should affirm Hawkes and disagree with 
Belle.97  Specifically, the Court should hold that an Approved Jurisdictional 
Determination (“AJD”) affects a party’s legal rights and, therefore, makes it a 
“final agency action” subject to immediate judicial review.  Six legal 
arguments support this position. Two policy arguments also support the 
conclusion that judicial review of an AJD serves as an effective limitation 
upon the Corps and the EPA’s (collectively “the agencies”) broad discretion 
over the definition of jurisdictional “waters of the United States.” It also 
incentivizes Corps officers to ensure the accuracy of its AJD. Alternately, if 
the agencies want to avoid judicial review, they should create an additional 
                                                
91 Id.  
92 Id. at 999. Congress intended that judicial review be “widely available to challenge actions 
of federal administrative officials.”  Id. at 999 (quoting Califano v. Sanders 430 U.S. 99, 104 
(1977)). 
93 Id. at 1002 (citing Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1375 (Alito, J. concurring)). 
94 Id. at 1002. 
95 Id. at 1002-03 (Kelly, J. concurring). 
96 Id.  
97 Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub 
nom. Kent Recycling Servs., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 135 S. Ct. 1548 (2015). 
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administrative appeal for landowners to contest an AJD. Whether the 
agencies create the additional administrative appeal or not, judicial review of 
Corps AJD should be available to landowners.    
A. An AJD Affects the Conduct of Landowners,  
Third Parties, and Agencies 
Clean Water Act (“CWA”) regulations and Corps administrative 
guidance documents reveal that the agencies intend an AJD to be legally 
binding upon landowners, third parties, and agencies themselves. This 
weakens the Corps’ position when it claims that an AJD does not affect the 
landowner. CWA regulations state that a local Corps officer’s assessment of 
a land’s potential for CWA jurisdiction “shall constitute a Corps final agency 
action”98 so that “the public can rely on that determination as a Corps final 
agency action.”99 Indeed, the Corps and the EPA state that “decisions 
concerning whether or not a waterbody is subject to the CWA have 
consequences for State, tribal, and local governments, and for private 
parties.”100 A Corps Regulatory Letter explains a landowner or other 
“affected party”101 may rely on an AJD if he or she brings a federal civil 
action contesting the accuracy of an AJD.102 An AJD is also binding on the 
agencies.103 The combination of the agencies’ intention to bind themselves to 
an AJD, the significant time and resources a local Corps office invests in an 
AJD, and the Corps’ creation of an immediate administrative appeal for a 
landowner to contest an AJD strongly indicate that an AJD “mean[s] 
something – for landowners and regulators alike.”104   
The Corps’ argument that a landowner’s rights are not affected by the 
Corps’ positive determination that it has CWA jurisdiction over the land is 
contrary to the Corps’ position that it intends for an AJD to be final and 
                                                
98 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a)(6) (2015).  
99 Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Eng’rs, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,207 
(Nov. 13, 1986). 
100 EPA and Corps Draft Guidance on Identifying Waters Protected by the Clean Water Act, 
at 2, available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!searchResults;rpp=25;po=0; s=EPA-HQ-
OW-2011-0409-0002;fp=true;ns=true. 
101 U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs RGL 08-02, at 2 (quoting 33 CFR § 331.2 (2014)).  
102 Id.  
103 Id.  
104 Amicus Curiae Brief Supporting Appellee at 13, Hawkes Co. Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015) (No. 13-3067), 2013 WL 6221825 at *13. 
JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 22, NO. 2 
 283 
relied upon by the landowner.  The Corps has indicated that it intends an AJD 
be final and relied upon by a landowner in use of his or her property. 
Additionally, when land is determined to be under CWA jurisdiction, the 
Corps has indicated third parties, the public at large, the Corps, and the EPA 
should rely on the Corps’ determination. One likely reason that the Corps 
maintains such contrary positions is that it is attempting to avoid judicial 
review of its AJDs. If the Corps ever had to litigate against a landowner 
contesting its jurisdiction, the Corps would very likely attempt to argue that 
its “conclusions of jurisdiction are entitled to the benefit of significant 
deference,” therefore avoiding a court’s intense scrutiny.105 The Corps in 
Hawkes likely wants to avoid judicial review because it erroneously 
authorized an AJD even though the local Corps officers provided no 
additional facts to prove the Corps’ jurisdiction over Hawkes’ parcel.106 The 
Eighth Circuit also suggested that the Corps may try to avoid judicial review 
of its AJD to preserve its autonomy in making such determinations.107 The 
Court should reject the Corps’ argument that an AJD is not a final agency 
action because the Corps treats an AJD as a final agency decision that affects 
a landowner, third parties, and the agencies themselves.  
B. An AJD Affects a Landowner’s Use of His or Her Land 
The second reason an affirmative CWA AJD affects a landowner’s 
legal rights and obligations is that an AJD significantly affects a landowner’s 
use of his or her land. An AJD changes the land’s potential regulatory burden 
and the land’s fair market value.108 An AJD affirming the presence of 
jurisdictional waters likely indicates the landowner must seek a CWA permit 
to use the land in any form. Estimated CWA permitting costs can be as high 
                                                
105  Id. See also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (“[A]n agency's 
interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form, given the ‘specialized experience 
and broader investigations and information’ available to the agency.”) (quoting Skidmore 
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944));  see also Precon Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng'rs, 633 F.3d 278, 297 (4th Cir. 2011) (agreeing with Corps that its 
jurisdictional determination was entitled to deference). See generally National Wildlife 
Federation v. Hanson 623 F.Supp. 1539, 1544 (E.D.N.C. 1985).  
106  Hawkes Co. Inc. et al. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994, 998 (8th Cir. 2015).  
107 Id. at 999.  
108 Amicus Curiae Brief Supporting Appellee, supra note 103, at 2. 
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as $300,000 and the permitting process may take between one109 and two-
and-a-half years.110 Landowners may incur additional costs and time delays 
by modifying their plans for the land’s use, or they may have to abandon use 
of the property altogether.111 This was the impression local Corps officers 
gave Hawkes on multiple occasions.112 A landowner may also incur 
additional costs to meet avoidance, minimization, and mitigation 
requirements under CWA regulations.113 These costs vary114 and may range 
between $400,000 and $1 million per acre.115  
Third, a CWA jurisdiction determination may affect the property’s 
fair market value.116 In one instance, a CWA jurisdiction determination 
reduced a land parcel’s appraisal from $32 million to $1 million dollars.117 
Tax assessments and Security and Exchange Commission reporting 
requirements may also indirectly and significantly affect a land’s fair market 
                                                
109 See David Sunding & David Zilberman, The Economics of Environmental 
Regulation by Licensing: An Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland 
Permitting Process, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 59, 74 (2002) (concluding that the average 
applicant spent $271,596 ($337,577 in 2011 dollar values) to prepare a CWA section 404 
individual permit application and $28,915 ($35,954 in 2011 dollar values) to prepare a 
nationwide permit application). 
110 Id. at 76.   
111 Amicus Curiae Brief Supporting Appellee, supra note 103, at 17. 
112 Hawkes Co., Inc., et al. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 782 F.3d 994, 998 
(8th Cir. 2015). 
113 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(1) (2014).  
(a) Except as provided under section 404(b)(2), no discharge of dredged or fill material shall 
be permitted if there is a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge which would have 
less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem, so long as the alternative does not have other 
significant adverse environmental consequences. 
(1) For the purpose of this requirement, practicable alternatives include, but are not limited 
to: 
(i) Activities which do not involve a discharge of dredged or fill material into the waters of 
the United States or ocean waters; 
(ii) Discharges of dredged or fill material at other locations in waters of the United States or 
ocean waters. 
114 Sunding & Zilberman, supra note 108, at 74. 
115 David Sunding, Review of EPA's Preliminary Economic Analysis of Guidance Clarifying 
the Scope of CWA Jurisdiction at 3 (July 26, 2011) available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D =EPA-HQ-OW-2011-0409-3514 (“Sunding 
Analysis of EPA Guidance”).  
116 Amicus Curiae Brief Supporting Appellee, supra note 103, at 2. 
117 Id. at 18-9. 
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value.118 The decrease in the fair market value reflects the use limitations an 
AJD imposes on land. Given this, an AJD affects a landowner’s ability to use 
his or her land. 
C. Peat-Mining Without a CWA Permit is Likely a “Knowing”  
CWA Violation 
The Corps has put Hawkes on notice that its parcel contains 
jurisdictional waters through the AJD. Combined with the strict liability 
nature of the CWA, which expressly prohibits “discharges” into statutory 
“navigable waters,”119 Hawkes would be in “knowing” violation of the CWA 
and acting in bad faith120 if it were to commence peat mining on its land. This 
would subject Hawkes to up to “$37,500 per day per violation” and potential 
criminal liability of up to three years imprisonment.121 As the Corps argues, 
and Belle held, because a looming agency enforcement action does not 
automatically trigger these penalties, there is no statutory or regulatory 
restriction limiting the Corps’ ability to begin tolling penalties from when the 
landowner begins to knowingly violate the CWA.122 Given the costs and time 
required to go through the CWA permit process,123 and the $1.7 billion the 
EPA generates collecting permitting fees and CWA penalties annually,124 the 
agencies have strong incentives to force a landowner through the permitting 
process. The Kent Recycling court and the district court in Hawkes were 
incorrect when they held that a landowner may mine without a permit and 
incur no penalties; a landowner may, in fact, be subject to penalties for 
knowingly violating the CWA.   
 
                                                
118 See Bergen Cnty. Assocs. v. Borough of E. Rutherford, 12 N.J. Tax 399, 403, 411, 
418 (N.J. Tax Ct. 1992) (land that had been valued at $47,500,000 reduced to $2,029,800 
based on determination that land included “waters of the United States”). 
119 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012).  
120 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (2012). 
121 U.S.v. Ciampitti, 669 F. Supp. 684, 699 (D.N.J. 1987). 
122 Id. 
123 Rapanos v. United States 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006). 
124 Id. 
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D. If Hawkes Pursued a CWA permit, It Would Do So At a Disadvantage 
Compared to Other Applicants 
Hawkes is at a disadvantage compared to other permit applicants 
because it would have to overcome a presumption in litigation that: 
“[N]o discharge of dredged or fill material shall be permitted 
if there is a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge 
which would have less adverse impact on the aquatic 
ecosystem . . . therefore the Corps may not issue a permit 
because there are “alternatives that would have less adverse 
impact.”125  
An AJD requires a landowner to prove why he or she should be 
granted a permit for discharging dredged or fill material when there are 
alternative uses of the parcel that would not affect jurisdictional waters.126 
Applicants without an AJD would not have to overcome such a presumption, 
thus hindering Hawkes. The Kent Recycling court ignores Supreme Court 
precedent on this issue when it says that a landowner who has received an 
AJD is in the same position as a CWA permit applicant who has not received 
an AJD. In contrast, the Eighth Circuit in Hawkes acknowledged the great 
time and cost associated with applying for a permit and the potential liability 
that a landowner may create for himself or herself by peat mining without a 
permit. Combined with the presumption that a landowner with an AJD has to 
overcome a higher burden in subsequent litigation compared to CWA 
applicants without an AJD, the Eighth Circuit in Hawkes properly recognizes 
the legal effect an AJD has on a landowner.  
 
                                                
125 Amicus Curiae Brief Supporting Appellee, supra note 99, at 2; see also Butte Envtl. 
Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 620 F.3d 936, 945 (9th Cir. 2010); see also 40 
C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(1) (2014) (“Except as provided under section 404(b)(2), no discharge of 
dredged or fill material shall be permitted if there is a practicable alternative to the proposed 
discharge which would have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem, so long as the 
alternative does not have other significant adverse environmental consequences.”). 
126  Greater Yellowstone Coal v. Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257, 1269 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing 
Utahns for Better Transp. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 305 F.3d 1152, 1186--87 (10th Cir. 
2002)). 
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E. The Corps’ Position is Inapposite to the CWA and APA’s Presumption 
of Judicial Review 
The Corps’ position is inapposite to the CWA and APA’s 
presumptions of judicial review. The APA intends that judicial review be 
widely available to contest federal agency decisions.127 The Corps’ attempt to 
preserve its broad discretion in defining jurisdictional waters of the United 
States at the cost of a landowner’s free use of his or her land is done in 
opposition to the CWA and APA’s presumptions of judicial review. The 
APA is consistent with Congress’ intent to have broad judicial review of 
agency actions.128  
As a result, absent a “showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of a 
contrary legislative intent,” judicial review requests should be interpreted as 
strongly favoring granting judicial review.129 The Corps has yet to argue that 
judicial review is contrary to congressional intent. The absence of such an 
argument by the Corps indicates that the Corps is likely aware that arguing 
so, as Justice Breyer stated, is in open disregard to “seventy five years of 
settled APA law that presumes that final agency action is reviewable.”130 The 
Sackett court also explained that, “the APA’s presumption of judicial review 
is a repudiation of the principle that efficiency of regulation conquers all.”131 
The Supreme Court should acknowledge that the Corps has not provided 
clear and convincing evidence that granting judicial review is contrary to the 
APA’s or the CWA’s legislative intent. As a result, the Court has an 
opportunity here to agree with Hawkes because the Eighth Circuit’s decision 
is consistent with the acts’ legislative intent.   
                                                
127 Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 999 (quoting Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104 (1977)).  
128 Administrative Procedure Act, Sen. Rep. No. 752 at 26 (1945) (“Very rarely do statutes 
withhold judicial review. It has never been the policy of Congress to prevent the 
administration of its own statutes from being judicially confined to the scope of authority 
granted or to the objectives specified. Its policy could not be otherwise, for in such a case 
statutes would in effect be blank checks drawn to the credit of some administrative officer or 
board.”) 
129  Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967). 
130 Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, 49, Sackett v. EPA, (No. 10-1062) (Jan. 9, 2012) (“Tr. 
Of Oral Arg.”).  
131 Sackett v. EPA, 132 S.Ct. 1367, 1374 (2012). 
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F. The Eighth Circuit in Hawkes Correct Correctly Applied  
Sackett v. E.P.A. 
 
The Eighth Circuit in Hawkes correctly applied the Sackett v. E.P.A. 
holding, while the Kent Recycling court mischaracterized Sackett. The Kent 
Recycling court and the Hawkes district court held that Sackett is 
distinguishable because Sackett involved a landowner seeking judicial review 
of an EPA enforcement action that required the landowner to take affirmative 
action on her property. The courts, however, mischaracterize the basis upon 
which the Sackett court made its decision. In determining that Sackett lacked 
no adequate remedy other than judicial review, the Court explained that 
“there is no reason to think that the Clean Water Act was uniquely designed 
to enable the strong-arming of regulated parties into ‘voluntary compliance’ 
without the opportunity for judicial review — even judicial review of the 
question whether the regulated party is within the EPA’s jurisdiction.”132  
The Sackett court plainly stated that review of the question whether a 
party is within the EPA’s jurisdiction may be reviewed judicially. This 
defeats the Corps’ argument and the Kent Recycling court’s holding that an 
AJD is not binding on a landowner. Enforcement of such a determination 
only comes with future agency action because Sackett acknowledges that the 
core issue in determining whether or not a compliance order is judicially 
reviewable is “whether [the] EPA had authority to assert CWA jurisdiction 
over the [landowner]’s land.”133 It is clear that the Eighth Circuit in Hawkes 
correctly applied Sackett, and the Supreme Court should make this clear by 
affirming Hawkes.  
G. Judicial Review of AJD Protects a Landowner’s Rights Against 
Otherwise Unfettered Agency Discretion 
           The Corps and the EPA’s decentralized and expansive definition of 
what parcels of land are sufficiently connected to jurisdictional “waters of the 
United States” is a standard that infringes upon a landowner’s use of his or 
                                                
132 Id. 
133 Id.; See also Amicus Curiae Brief Supporting Appellee, supra note 99, at 21-2. 
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her land.134 The Corps argued that Hawkes’s parcel was sufficiently 
connected to “waters of the United States” via a series of unnamed culverts 
and streams spanning 120 miles.135 Such a determination is difficult for a 
landowner to anticipate. The Corps’ AJD also seems to minimally protect the 
bodies of water over which the CWA has jurisdiction given the significant 
degree of attenuation between the parcel and jurisdictional waters. The CWA 
does not grant the Corps jurisdiction over all water in the United States, nor 
any piece of land upon which water travels.136  
As the Supreme Court stated in Rapanos v. United States, in the last 
30 years, the agencies have expanded their jurisdiction “to cover 270-to-300 
million acres of swampy lands in the United States – including half of Alaska 
and an area the size of California.”137 This expansive definitional power 
allows the agencies to generate nearly two billion dollars in permitting fees 
and CWA fines. 138 The Corps’ current practice also forces landowners to 
expend costs to hire environmental experts or to depend on local Corps’ 
officials’ determinations on whether or not their parcel is subject to CWA 
permitting. This process is confusing and AJD outcomes are unpredictable. 
Allowing the Corps to retain unfettered authority in deciding whether it has 
jurisdiction over a parcel significantly diminishes a landowner’s use of his or 
her land. As a result, the Supreme Court should affirm the Eighth Circuit that 
judicial review is an appropriate limitation upon the Corps and the EPA’s 
regulatory power.  
H. Judicial Review of AJD Incentivizes the Corps to Ensure the Accuracy 
of its Determinations 
Judicial review of AJD serves as an incentive for local Corps offices 
to ensure the accuracy of their determinations. The agencies should also take 
greater efforts to ensure the accuracy of their AJD to avoid spending 
government resources defending against landowners who seek judicial 
review of an AJD. The agencies could avoid frequent judicial review of AJDs 
                                                
130 Sackett, 132 S.Ct. at 1375. 
135 Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 998. 
136 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006). 
137 Id. at 722.  
138 Id. at 721. 
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by creating a second administrative appeal for landowners to contest an AJD. 
Allowing a landowner to have a second administrative appeal would likely 
increase the accuracy of AJDs and lower the number of cases landowners file 
against the agencies for judicial review.  
An additional internal appeal procedure would also increase revenue 
the agencies could make in the CWA permitting process. While increased 
permitting costs are somewhat harmful to applicants, paying for a second 
administrative appeal would likely be cheaper than suing the Corps in federal 
court. However, the decentralized organization of the Corps makes it difficult 
to compare the Corps’ current practice to the appeal and permitting 
procedures of other federal agencies. Adding this appeal step would greater 
protect a landowner’s rights and likely avoid outcomes like in Hawkes. 
Regardless of whether the agencies adopt a second administrative appeal 
procedure, judicial review of AJD serves as an effective mechanism for 
ensuring the quality of a Corps’ AJD and it protects landowners from the 
potential burdens of an affirmative AJD.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
 The Supreme Court should affirm the Eighth Circuit’s decision in 
Hawkes and effectively disagree with Kent Recycling. The six above legal 
arguments strongly indicate that an AJD affects a landowner’s legal rights 
and obligations. This outcome is not only legally correct, but it also creates 
the proper limitations on the broad discretion agencies have over the 
definition of “waters of the United States” that protect landowners’ rights. 
Judicial review also incentivizes the Corps to make accurate AJDs because 
otherwise the Corps will be subject to judicial scrutiny of its decisions. In 
addition, the agencies could adopt a second administrative appeal. This 
would better protect a landowner’s rights and generate more revenue for the 
agencies. However, given that such an additional administrative appeal 
procedure is uncommon, the agencies may not consider this option. 
Regardless, judicial review of AJDs should remain available to landowners to 
protect their rights, and the Supreme Court can ensure this by affirming the 
Eighth Circuit’s decision in Hawkes.  
 
